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Law and Science Fiction
Mitchell Travis*
Abstract: In this article I argue for greater attention to be paid to science fiction within sociolegal 
scholarship. In the first half of this paper I highlight that science fiction and law are already inter-
twined, science fiction having been commented on in a number of judicial decisions and law having 
been the focus of a number of science fiction texts. I then move on to outline how the law and science 
fiction are further interrelated. I begin by noting how law draws upon popular culture, and discuss 
how, in some instances, the law can realize science fiction. I then highlight science fiction’s usefulness 
as critique and how this feeds into the way that law draws upon popular culture. In the second half 
of the article, I exemplify these processes using the case of the admixed embryo. I examine admixed 
embryos within science fiction, using the 1995 film Species as a starting point. I explore the reciprocal 
relationship between popular attitudes and science fiction, then question how these factors influenced 
the amendments to the U.K. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. To conclude, I reassert 
the interpenetration of law and science fiction, arguing that both disciplines are inextricably tied to one 
another as they try to, respectively, regulate and envisage the future.
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Science fiction is perhaps the most innovative of popular forms. It is also one 
of the most critical. The representation of all new worlds involves a process of 
reflection and comparison with a society as it is now. This means that science 
fiction can have a consciously utopian function; but it can also extrapolate the 
worst social trends, warning of terrifying futures.
— Scott McCracken, Pulp: Reading Popular Fiction (998)1
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I n t r o d u c t I o n
In this article, I argue that greater attention should be paid to science fiction within 
sociolegal scholarship. After attempting a definition of the term “science fiction,” 
the first part of the paper highlights some of the ways in which science fiction 
and law are already intertwined, noting that a number of judicial opinions have 
commented on science fiction and that many science fiction texts have focused 
on law. Elaborating on these connections, I argue that, in some instances, the 
law allows for the realization of entities previously thought of as science fiction. 
I also highlight science fiction’s usefulness as a critique of both law and society, 
explaining how this function of science fiction feeds into the way that law draws 
upon popular culture. Science fiction allows for a space in which alternate social 
and legal systems, conditions, and variables can be considered, and it is beneficial 
for law to consider these alternate situations, given that they are often inspired by 
popular attitudes. By considering science fiction’s representations of the different 
approaches that could be taken to possible legal problems of the future, the law 
will be better equipped to deal with these problems when they eventually arise.
The second part of the article exemplifies these processes using the case of 
the admixed embryo, an embryo that contains both human and animal DNA. 
Although sections 3 and  of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(HFE Act) 990 originally prohibited the creation of hybrid embryos, the 
2008 amendments to the Act have allowed admixed embryos for research 
purposes. The second half of this article examines admixed embryos within 
science fiction, focusing on the 995 film Species. Using the film as a start­
ing point, I first explore the reciprocal relationship between popular attitudes 
and science fiction, and then consider to what extent both science fiction and 
the popular attitudes it expresses may have influenced the amendments to the 
HFE Act. To conclude, I reassert the interpenetration of law and science fic­
tion, arguing that both disciplines are inextricably tied to one another as they 
try to, respectively, regulate and envisage the future.2
Pa r t  I :  S c I e n c e  F I c t I o n  a n d  L a w
defining Science Fiction
. . . science fiction has come to permeate our culture to such a degree that its 
basic repertory of images—rocket ships and robots, aliens and dinosaurs—are 
standard items in the fantasy life of any preschooler.3
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Science fiction has had a huge influence on the imagination of contempo­
rary society, and most people are aware of its tropes and themes from an early 
age. This section will sketch a working definition of science fiction, and in 
doing so make some references to its history.
The first time the term “science fiction” was hinted at was in April 92 in 
the pulp magazine Amazing Stories. Editor Hugo Gernsback wrote:
By “scientifiction” I mean the Jules Verne, H.G. Wells and Edgar Allen Poe 
type of story—a charming romance intermingled with scientific fact and pro­
phetic vision. . . . Not only do these amazing tales make tremendously interest­
ing reading—they are always instructive. They supply knowledge . . . in a very 
palatable form. . . . New inventions pictured for us in the scientifiction of today 
are not at all impossible of realisation tomorrow.4
Narrow definitions of science fiction often claim that there was no science 
fiction before 92, and that science fiction began within the pages of Amazing 
Stories. On this reading, science fiction began simultaneously with its defini­
tion. Gernsback’s definition of science fiction, however, clearly draws upon 
an earlier body of writers whose work, at the time they were writing, was 
not defined as science fiction. This has led some to suggest that science fiction 
includes works written by authors such as Edgar Allen Poe and Jules Verne, 
or even that it began with these authors.
Disch, a proponent of the view that Poe is the forefather of modern science 
fiction, notes that many other authors have been proposed as the first writer of 
science fiction. The legend of Gilgamesh, for example, is often cited as the ear­
liest known science fiction. Similarly “J,” the accredited but unknown author 
of Noah and the flood and the Tower of Babel, gets comparable endorsement.5 
However, Disch criticizes these views, maintaining that if “myths and legends 
are to be accredited as science fiction, then half of the world literature before 
the novel must be accounted ancestral to science fiction.”6 By allowing mythol­
ogy a place as the urtext of science fiction, we make the genre’s definition too 
broad. Although it is true that science fiction has many similarities with these 
ancient legends, it can also be argued that this is true of all fiction. Instead, I 
would argue that science fiction grew out of a range of subgenres. Darko Suvin 
identifies some of these, including the “fortunate island” story of medieval and 
classical literature, the “fabulous voyage” literature of antiquity, the “planetary 
novel” and “utopian stories” of the renaissance, the “state political novels” 
of the enlightenment, and the “dystopian literature” of (post)modern times.7 
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As King and Kryzwinska note, “It is precisely science fiction’s diversity and 
flexibility, through its ability to absorb ideas from other domains, that has kept 
the genre alive for more than a century.”8 Kincaid argues, on a similar basis, 
that there is no singular, definitive urtext, but rather a multitude of sources.9
This plethora of influences is part of the reason that “science fiction” is 
such a contested term. The many debates about the term’s meaning have led 
the authors of The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction to conclude:
There is really no good reason to expect that a workable definition of science 
fiction will ever be established. None has been, so far. In practice, there is much 
consensus about what science fiction looks like in its centre; it is only at the 
fringes that most of the fights take place. And it is still not possible to describe 
science fiction as a homogeneous form of writing.10
Kincaid suggests, however, that we should see science fiction as an um­
brella term, similar to the word “sport.”11 It is impossible to define “sport” 
simply by referring to the rules of football or tennis, for example. This does 
not mean, of course, that there is no such thing as sport. Perhaps we can see 
similarities here with law; it would be difficult, for example, to define “law” 
by describing only contract law. This sort of description would fail to accom­
modate the many different aspects of law. As Kincaid sensibly deduces:
Science fiction is what we point to when we say “science fiction,” and where the 
genre begins historically and what constitutes that genre will vary as the direc­
tion in which we point varies. But because we can identify the various threads 
that combine to form the whole, so we can talk sensibly about the genre and 
understand others when they do the same, and so we can draw an historical 
model for the genre in which the details may vary but the overall narrative tells 
a story we all understand.12
Despite arguments about the nature of science fiction, we can see that, 
for the most part, science fiction has a recognizable style and deals with fa­
miliar themes. Disch, for example, notes that “[s]cience fiction is an indus­
try, or rather a major component of two large industries, the movies and 
publishing.”13 Similarly, Suvin recognizes that science fiction represents a 
massive part of both the film and publishing industries, as it is a genre that has 
managed to sell consistently for the better part of one hundred years and is 
popular in all of the leading industrial nations.14
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These definitions clarify science fiction in an industrial sense, but fail to 
distinguish it from other literary and film genres. Melzer, by contrast, goes 
some way toward defining “science fiction” by noting the “recurrent themes 
and approaches” that are common in the genre.15 Melzer highlights, first, that 
science fiction often focuses on socioeconomic relationships. Second, she 
perceives science fiction to be a space in which the conflicts between moder­
nity and postmodernity can be negotiated. Third, she indicates that science 
fiction is a space in which a consideration of technology and its implications 
can take place. Finally, she notes that science fiction is a genre that highlights 
the constructed qualities of both culture and nature.16 All of these themes are 
often, though not always, strongly related to human life. Indeed, it is this 
familiarity of the human, coupled with the strangeness of the environment 
or situation, that Melzer believes is at the heart of science fiction.17 Suvin 
echoes this point:
Science fiction is . . . a literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions 
are the presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose 
main formal device is an imaginative framework alternative to the author’s em­
pirical environment.18
The idea of estrangement is important to any understanding of science fic­
tion. The interplay of the familiar and the strange, highlighted by Suvin, cuts 
to the genre’s very core. Whether the genre must also establish an imaginative 
framework other than the author’s environment is more debatable. Although 
many works are removed in time and space (“a long time ago in a galaxy 
far far away,” for example), many others take place in worlds similar to the 
author’s environment, albeit with the addition of new contexts or situations 
that add a sense of alterity (Independence Day [99], The Day After Tomorrow 
[200], Donnie Darko [200], etc.).19
Although Suvin’s emphasis on removal from the author’s environment as 
an essential element of the genre’s definition is hence problematic, the inter­
play between estrangement and the familiar seems to be a constant.20
In the case of Species, the example that I shall be using in this article, we 
witness a world very similar to our own. The estrangement from our own 
world comes in the form of contact with an alien race and the gestation of 
an admixed embryo. It is difficult to discuss the issues surrounding admixed 
embryos without referring to science fiction. Indeed, much of the media 
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coverage surrounding admixed embryos claimed that “this is no longer sci­
ence fiction.”
Though tales of human­animal hybrids date back centuries, one of the 
earliest science fiction writers to touch on this theme was H. G. Wells in 
his novel The Island of Dr. Moreau (89). In the text, Dr. Moreau creates 
a number of human­animal hybrids who learn, through law, how to live in 
society. Eventually, transgressions of the law lead the hybrids to reject their 
human status and return to their animal natures. The novel seems to sup­
port the view that animal­human hybrids are a monstrous abomination and 
should be prohibited. They are monstrous, one could argue, in the Foucaul­
dian sense that they are at once a transgression of both nature and law. As 
Sharpe explains:
[Human­animal hybrids] involve a double breach, of nature and law. They in­
volve a breach of nature because the process of their creation entails mixing 
human and animal. They involve a breach of law because mixing of this kind 
introduces a profound challenge to a key legal distinction. . . . The confusion 
that human­animal hybrids introduce into the law can be considered to be of 
the most profound kind. It is, perhaps, at least in part, for this reason that law 
seeks to prohibit, rather than regulate through a process of normalisation, as 
has been the case in relation to . . . other legal monsters.21
Science fiction represents an arena in which these monsters can be brought 
to life and where their transgressions of both law and nature can be realized. 
It represents a space where the implications of biotechnologies can be con­
sidered. In The Island of Dr. Moreau, the creation of these monsters led to a 
questioning of the motives of scientists. This sense of suspicion regarding the 
motives of scientists when considering the idea of human­animal hybridity 
seems to have persisted until contemporary times. H. G. Wells captured the 
public mood of the time and reinforced it with his novel. Indeed, two years 
after the novel was published, the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisec­
tion was created. Through this text, we can begin to see the role science fiction 
plays in both capturing and reinforcing public opinion.
Human­animal hybridity remained science fiction until the HFE Act 
990, which prohibited the creation of admixed embryos. Through its de­
scription of these entities, the law made a space for them to become real. In 
995, just under a hundred years after The Island of Dr. Moreau, the novel’s 
themes and tropes were reexamined in the film Species. Again human­animal 
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hybridity came to the fore, along with concepts of monstrosity, natality, and 
personhood.
Before turning to my analysis of Species and its relationship to the admixed 
embryo issue, I would first like to explore the idea that science fiction has 
already, to some extent, permeated the consciousness of the judiciary, having 
been referenced in a variety of cases.
Judicial conceptions of Science Fiction
It is part of the inspiration of the Law and Literature project that the divisions 
we make between different ways of reading, writing, and learning and between 
different disciplines are therefore cultural rather than natural, constructed 
rather than given.22
Science fiction has considered law and matters of jurisprudence in many of 
its texts; I argue, however, that this relationship is reciprocal. Science fiction 
has permeated the imagination of law, the judiciary, the legislature, and the 
electorate. Threadgold highlights the need for law to engage with the pro­
cesses by which texts make its meanings,23 and in this section I highlight some 
of the different areas in which law has explicitly engaged with science fiction 
and its themes. As a consequence of this engagement, I argue, legal language 
is, in some areas, a language of science fiction.
The judiciary has considered science fiction in a number of different con­
texts. I will mention four.
First, law deals with science fiction in patents and copyrights that formally 
recognize it as a genre in both literature and film.24
Second, science fiction is often presented in case law as the pastime of the 
mentally unstable, listed as the hobby of, amongst others: rapists,25 pedophiles,26 
and the mentally ill.27 This is despite the fact that in 998, science fiction ac­
counted for one in ten books sold in Britain, and in the United States as many 
as one in four.28 In addition, sixteen of the top fifty highest grossing films of all 
time have been science fiction oriented.29 To single science fiction out as a de­
viant pastime, therefore, seems a little unfair, if not empirically questionable.
The third way that the term “science fiction” is used in law is as a descriptive 
term when speaking of events that legal parties were not adequately prepared 
to deal with, such as in the analysis of advertising contracts that did not fore­
see the growth of Internet advertising.30 In the case of Hiram Walker & Sons 
Inc. v. Drambuie Liqueur Co. (998), the parties went to Court over a dispute 
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regarding Internet advertising. Lord Penrose, adjudicating, claimed that at the 
time that the contract was made, Internet advertising was “science fiction.” In 
this instance, science fiction was impliedly conceptualized as something that 
can, to some extent, accurately predict future challenges to law and society.31
The fourth sense of science fiction, and perhaps the most interesting, per­
tains to judicial speculation. The judiciary sometimes considers how its deci­
sions may have been affected if the circumstances of a case had been relevantly 
altered by ideas found in the genre of science fiction. Judges have engaged in 
this type of speculation with regard to the creation and manufacture of arti­
ficial life,32 in addressing the issue of whether torture can be carried out by 
a nonhuman machine,33 and in relation to the increasingly porous boundary 
between life and death.34
By acknowledging that circumstances previously imagined only in science 
fiction, such as the growth of the Internet, the creation of artificial life, and 
advances in cutting­edge medical techniques, can influence legal doctrine, the 
judiciary has demonstrated a willingness to draw upon the imagery of science 
fiction to convey its opinions. This willingness may indicate that science fic­
tion is able to capture cultural attitudes and trends in a way that law cannot. 
As a result, the imagery present within the worlds of science fiction moves 
into the popular vernacular, and from there, eventually, into the legal lexicon. 
By focusing on relationships between culture and technology, science fiction 
can predict and confront social and technological change before these matters 
have been considered by the judiciary. As Aristodemou notes, “While judges 
and legislators are constrained by precedent and financial and political inter­
ests, literature enjoys the freedom to take risks, dislocate old laws and struc­
tures, and articulate new imaginaries which may in turn become laws.”35 By 
imagining possible interplays and worst­case scenarios, science fiction allows 
for a cultural response, consideration, and critique of events before they oc­
cur. As a genre, science fiction is arguably more apt to deal with these sorts of 
issues than other forms of film or literature, as it more directly concerns itself 
with issues surrounding the future and technology. By highlighting possible 
futures, science fiction enables law to consider different strategies for dealing 
with new events and scenarios. I will now consider more thoroughly the ways 
in which science fiction is useful to law. Using the example of the admixed 
embryo, I seek to demonstrate that science fiction both highlights (or even 
fuels) existing cultural concerns and creates a space in which to consider the 
implications of new technologies.
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Pa r t  I I :  t h e  a d m I x e d  e m b r yo  I n  L a w  a n d  
S c I e n c e  F I c t I o n
Law in, and as, Science Fiction
In Britain, sections 3 and  of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
of 990 banned the creation of hybrid embryos, which is to say embryos con­
taining both human and animal DNA. Section 3(2)(a) of the Act banned the 
placing of any live gametes or embryos other than human gametes or em­
bryos into a woman. Additionally, section 3(3)(b) prohibited the placing of a 
human embryo into an animal. Under section ()(c), the mixing of human 
gametes with the live gametes of any animal was also prohibited. At the time 
the Act was passed, very few scientists were working on the concept of hybrid 
embryos, and the idea of mixing human and animal DNA within an embryo 
“seemed . . . to inhabit the outer reaches of scientific fiction.”36 Isabel Karpin 
has argued that, by describing and prohibiting nonexistent entities—in this 
case the admixed embryo—the law becomes responsible for their creation:
The idea that law, through its prohibitions, is actually engaged in fictional 
productions is a radical view, yet it is clearly happening. Although the legal 
response is to defer the engagement with alterity, nevertheless, through the ar­
ticulation of that deferral, law is engaged in imaginary practices which give 
legal form to those proscribed embryos in order to bring their undecidability to 
order. The possibility of these prohibited embryonic forms is made real by the 
recognition of the inevitability of legal failure. The stated aim of law to stop the 
creation of these forms raises the tantalising possibility that the law will not or 
cannot stop them.37
In a sense, according to Karpin, the law created the admixed embryos 
through its prohibition of them. I would like to build on Karpin’s analysis 
in three different areas. First, I would argue that, given the relative dearth 
of scientific research into the area of hybridity when the HFE Act 990 was 
being contemplated, law drew upon the huge and available body of popular 
discourse in its initial decision to prohibit the admixed embryo. Second, by 
prohibiting this form of human­animal hybridity in the context of the labora­
tory, the law contributed to these entities becoming realized. Third, we can see 
that the law, through its engagement with the admixed embryo, has inspired a 
new generation of science fiction. This new generation includes, for example, 
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Vincenzo Natali’s film Splice (2009), Alastair Reynold’s book Redemption Ark 
(2002), Margaret Atwood’s latest offerings, Oryx and Crake (2003) and The 
Year of the Flood (2009), and the 99 remake of The Island of Dr. Moreau, 
featuring Marlon Brando and Val Kilmer. This new science fiction, in turn, 
filters back into the public discourse and begins to affect our understandings of 
new technologies. These science­fiction­influenced conceptualizations perme­
ate society, and the judiciary, legislators, and voters draw on them in making 
new laws.
Popular culture, and consequently science fiction, can be seen as having 
a political dimension, particularly when we consider Posner and Sherwin’s 
insight that many people witness the legal and political systems exclusively 
through the medium of popular culture.38 As these authors note, individu­
als do not, for the most part, have very much direct contact with the legal 
system. Instead, for a majority of people, knowledge and experience of the 
law is mediated by and filtered through the lens of popular culture. Mukerji 
and Schudson argue that, because of this interconnectedness, popular texts 
are worthy of further study “not simply because they are popular but because 
they may contribute to, or impede, rational and critical participation in the 
political world.”39 Sherwin echoes this view:
. . . ordinary expectations, shared values and popular beliefs—what might be 
called the collective “folk knowledge” of the community—enter into the law 
directly by the way of the jury in civil and criminal cases, and indirectly by way 
of the ballot, the process by which citizens put judges and legislators into (or 
out of ) power. But there is more. Popular culture, especially through its chief 
agency, the visual mass media, also contributes to law by helping to shape the 
very processes of thought and perception by which jurors judge and voters 
vote. Put simply, it is a source of both meaning and the meaning­making tools 
people use to think and speak with.40
Using Sherwin’s framework, we can see that the concept of the admixed 
embryo did not arise in a cultural vacuum. Indeed, the concept of interspecies 
hybridity has been around for millennia, occurring in folk tales and myths of 
minotaurs and werewolves and in science fiction tales such as Alien (979) 
and The Fly (98).41 In this context, we can see that law, rather than creating 
the admixed embryo, is re­imagining a familiar concept of popular culture.42 
In this sense, law is drawing upon popular culture, in the process speaking 
the language of science fiction. Films such as Alien and The Fly, for example, 
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although not considering the admixed embryo directly, did consider notions 
of human­alien­animal hybridity, natality, and the consequent effects. The 
effects of this hybridity, as posited in Alien and The Fly, were negative. In 
keeping with Sherwin’s hypotheses, films like these could have both drawn 
from and propagated (in terms of reconfirming and reestablishing) the cul­
tural unease surrounding admixed embryos and hence ultimately influenced 
the decision to impose a total ban on interspecies embryos.43 We witness here, 
in a very vivid sense, the interpenetration of law and literature, both of which 
are situated in and constituted by the broader culture.44
Part of the uniqueness of science fiction is its ability to take familiar con­
cepts and reinvent them; to place them in an unfamiliar or disturbing, futuris­
tic or technological setting. The familiar concept of the human­animal hybrid 
is displaced by law into the technological setting of the embryo in the labora­
tory, and thus into the realm of science fiction. In the process of this displace­
ment, or reimagining, law becomes science fiction.
If we return to our definitions of science fiction, we can see that the HFE 
Act 990 has some of the characteristics Melzer identifies as essential to sci­
ence fiction. The Act focuses on future and, at the time of its drafting, nonex­
istent, technology.45 Similarly, returning to Hugo Gernsback’s early definition 
of science fiction, we can see the Act as a mixture of scientific fact and “pro­
phetic vision,” as instructive and (arguably) interesting reading, as providing 
knowledge (of the admixed embryo) in a palatable form and, as we now know, 
a form not impossible to realize.46
As noted above, many representations of law appear within the worlds of 
science fiction. Often, these worlds reflect our own cultures and, as a conse­
quence, usefully critique contemporary law. There is a general consensus that 
science fiction allows us to explore, as far as we possibly can, “new social orders 
and ways of being that differ radically from human existence as we know it.”47 
However, I would argue that our imaginations and the language we use are 
bound to, and are products of, current cultural and social paradigms. Our abil­
ity to imagine a future world that is radically different from our own is there­
fore somewhat curtailed. Indeed, as Jameson notes, “On the social level . . . our 
imaginations are hostages to our own mode of production (and perhaps to 
whatever remnants of past ones it has preserved).”48 Rather than viewing this 
limitation as a failure of science fiction, we can see it as a positive. Frederic 
Jameson, for example, highlights the fact that “the treatment of imaginary 
societies in the best dystopian fiction is always highly relevant more or less 
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directly to specific ‘realworld’ societies and issues.”49 King and Krzywinska 
similarly note that, by drawing on contemporary concerns about technology 
and scientific endeavor, science fiction gains both relevance and its source of 
dramatic tension.50 Baudrillard takes this point further when he notes that sci­
ence fiction “is most often nothing other than an unbounded projection of the 
real world of production, but it is not qualitively different from it.”51
It is because of the interpenetration of law and science fiction that the latter 
can point toward possible deficits or problems within the current law. By doing 
so, science fiction “and its fantasies of the future provide a critical view of the 
present.”52 By distancing itself from, or simply displacing, the real, science fic­
tion can act as a critical commentary on contemporary society. Furthermore, 
by allowing us to examine potential future legal approaches, it allows us to 
better see the strengths and inadequacies of the law’s current approach(es).53 
The more science fiction draws upon the concerns, doubts, and ideas of the 
real world, the more valid these questions become. In a sense, science fiction 
begins to serve “an essentially epistemological function.”54
Science fiction’s relevance to the real world contributes to its position 
as a popular genre of film and literature, but also increases the likelihood 
of its being drawn upon by law and the judiciary. This cultural resonance 
is what generates law’s desire to draw from science fiction. Indeed, to go 
back to my earlier point, because of this isomorphic relationship, science 
fiction becomes the source of meaning and the language in which society 
discusses new legal challenges; by using current concerns to generate their 
content, works of science fiction can be seen not only as reflections, but also 
as commentaries upon contemporary society. As Suvin writes, science fic­
tion uses “imagination as a means of understanding the tendencies latent in 
reality.”55 This is a view also expounded upon by Telotte, who argues that 
science fiction
not only provides us with a most appropriate language for talking about a large 
dimension of technologically inflicted postmodern culture, but also . . . help[s] 
us make sense of our culture’s quandaries.56
Science fiction not only gives us a framework in which to discuss cultural 
concerns, but also gives us a space in which to consider issues of jurispruden­
tial importance. Through engagement with science fiction, these concerns can 
then filter back into the public discourse and, ultimately, back into the law.57 
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We can see, therefore, the strongly integrated relationship between law and 
science fiction.
(Inter)Species: Popular culture, Law, and the admixed embryo
In this section, I wish to further outline the relationship between law and sci­
ence fiction using the example of the admixed embryo. The science fiction 
text that I wish to discuss in relation to the creation of admixed embryos is 
the 995 film Species. I argue that the cultural concerns raised by the creation 
of admixed embryos were reflected in the film and, subsequently, in the law’s 
approach to these entities.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFE Authority) 
reported on the dominant cultural attitudes toward admixed embryos in its 
response to its public consultation, which revealed that half of those ques­
tioned in a public survey disagreed with the creation of admixed embryos for 
research purposes.58 Of those questioned, 9 percent were worried “because 
of what scientists might want to do next in research,” and 7 percent stated 
that their opposition was grounded in the idea of “meddling with nature.”59 
Many science fiction texts also focus on these same two fundamental concerns. 
Sharpe considers the reasoning behind these anxieties, noting:
In the specific context of human/animal experimentation, public alarm proves 
to be an effect of a perceived loss of the distinctiveness of human being, fear over 
the possibility of cross species disease transmission . . . and moral objection.60
All of these concerns are articulated in Species. In the film, a signal from 
Earth containing the mapping of the human genome is returned from space 
(apparently by some benevolent alien species) with instructions on how to 
successfully combine human and alien DNA. Scientists then use this informa­
tion to create an admixed embryo. The embryo rapidly gestates, however, and 
quickly takes on the appearance of an adult female, named “Sil.”61 After an 
attempt to destroy her, Sil breaks free from the scientific research compound 
where she is being held and embarks on a mission to procreate.
This text raises a number of issues. First, the hybrid looks like a (beautiful) 
human; her desire to become impregnated would potentially result in hybrid 
children and species pollution. Humanity itself, therefore, comes under threat 
from the sexuality of the (monstrous feminine) hybrid.62 Sil falls into two of 
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the categories of the monstrous feminine identified by Creed: the “woman as 
monstrous womb” and the “woman as beautiful but deadly killer.”63 Further­
more, two of the categories that Sharpe identifies as causing public alarm are 
realized here: the humanness of the hybrid creates a loss of distinctiveness 
within the category of the human being, and by painting hybrid children as 
having pandemic­like consequences, the possibility of disease transmission 
is raised.
Underlying the film Species is a threat of unlocked or repressed female sex­
uality.64 A fear of the reproductive female body seems to emerge; Sil’s beauti­
ful outer body is contrasted with her monstrous womb.65 As Creed notes, the 
horror film often invokes the “ancient connection between woman, womb, 
and the monstrous.”66 Gender, in the case of Sil, is an important part of her 
monstrosity. Her desire to be impregnated, to reproduce, is a danger to soci­
ety. Her libido, her sexuality, threatens to unleash a pandemic. The fear of the 
hybrid child is mixed with the fear of female sexuality, single parenthood, and 
the breakdown of society. The mixing of human and animal (or in this case, 
alien) reveals the supposed animal nature of female sexuality.67 The hybrid 
represents both the temptress and the killer (the hybrid kills the males once 
she has mated, or attempted to mate, with them). 
In one sense, this mixing of the fear of the admixed embryo with the fear 
of female sexuality can be blamed on the film, as the titillating nature of the 
text is clearly intended to result in box office sales. In another sense, however, 
this mixture perhaps reveals a more general cultural bias that has seeped into 
the discourse surrounding admixed embryos. Both the admixed embryo and 
the female body have been characterized as having “a propensity to leak, to 
overflow the proper distinctions between self and other, to contaminate and 
engulf.”68 Within this lack of delineation lies the potential for danger and il­
legality, and both the female body and the embryo become stigmatized.69 The 
dangerousness of the female body and of the embryo are contrasted with the 
legal ideal of the normative male body, which is characterized by its bounded, 
impenetrable, and separate nature. Through this feminist lens, we can per­
haps see the “moral objection” mentioned by Sharpe in his categories of pub­
lic alarm as being related to moralistic discourses about gender and sexuality. 
We can see, therefore, that Species plays out some of the public’s concerns 
regarding admixed embryos, particularly those issues Sharpe identifies as a 
loss in delineation between the human and other entities, moral objection, and 
disease transmission between species.
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The HFE Authority report also registered public unease around the idea 
of scientists “meddling with nature.”70 Again, this concern seems to indicate 
anxiety surrounding the consequences of hybrid embryos becoming fully 
gestated.71 Admixed embryos begin to call the notion of the human into ques­
tion at a conceptual level.72
Some of the possible consequences of failing to prohibit admixed em­
bryos become particularly apparent in Species, where the admixed em­
bryo is brought to term. At this point, the conceptual confusion between 
human and animal becomes most realized. The entity looks human but 
is not. The rights and personhood associated with “birth” become im­
mediately problematic. From a legal perspective, a major reason to pro­
hibit admixed embryos is so that the law does not have to decide what to 
do with them once they become fully gestated, since embryos themselves 
lack legal personhood. Science fiction is able to ignore these prohibitions, 
and hence forces us to consider the moral and legal status of these entities. 
As we try to map out the triangulation between science fiction, law, and 
popular opinion, I will now try to assess the similarities between the ideas 
and conceptualizations that inform the film Species and the current United 
Kingdom legislation regarding admixed embryos.
Law drawing from Science Fiction: the admixed embryo
In 2008, changes were made to the way that admixed embryos were regulated 
in the United Kingdom. Under the HFE Act 2008, human­animal mixing at 
the cellular level was allowed for nonreproductive research purposes.73 This 
was qualified by the proviso that no admixed embryo is allowed to survive 
past fourteen days.74 In keeping with the HFE Act 990, it is still prohibited to 
place a human admixed embryo, or any gametes other than human gametes, 
into a woman.75 It is also still prohibited to place a human admixed embryo 
into an animal.76
Which, if any, of these amendments to the way we regulate admixed em­
bryos did Species envisage? In answering this question, it is useful to consider 
Aristodemou’s view that narratives create rather than mirror “our lives, our­
selves and our worlds. Whether in law, in literature or . . . in law and litera­
ture, narratives are not neutral, they investigate but also suggest, create and 
legislate meanings.”77 In Species, the law allowed for the creation of admixed 
embryos, but it also set a time limit after which the entity must be destroyed. 
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In the film, this date was much later than fourteen days, and this more gener­
ous time limit allowed for the threat that Sil later posed. The earlier termina­
tion date advocated by the HFE Act 2008 avoids this dual threat to both the 
concept of “human” and the literal survival of humankind as we know it. As 
Karpin suggests, however, these time limits and prohibitions may not hold for 
very long. Science fiction, public opinion, and the law are all likely to offer 
differing conceptualizations of the admixed embryo in the future.
Looking at the differences between the two Acts, 990 and 2008, we can 
see a shift in focus from the prohibition of the entity itself to a prohibition 
of reproduction and natality. This change in emphasis is reminiscent of 
the anxieties present within the world of Species. Although Sil had incred­
ible strength and was a remorseless killer, she was not, as an individual, 
a threat to society; the threat she represented was through the supposed 
pandemic consequences of her reproductive activities.78 In this instance, 
the entity itself was not (at first) prohibited; reproduction, as in the HFE 
Act 2008, became the prohibited act. Although the U.K. government, in 
amending the Act, did not directly heed the advice of science fiction, it 
may have yielded to public distrust as encapsulated in and propagated 
by texts such as Species. To return to the HFE Authority consultation re­
sponse, 9 percent of individuals questioned disagreed with the creation 
of admixed embryos because they were worried about what “scientists 
might want to do next in research”; similarly, 7 percent disagreed from a 
distrust of scientists “meddling with nature.”79 
Both of these themes are played out to a large extent within Species. As Fox 
notes, the HFE Authority sought to downplay such worries by suggesting 
that educating the public about these technologies could alleviate their con­
cerns. The Authority reported, “People who know more about the possibility 
of creating embryos that contain some human and some animal material are 
more likely to agree [with the technology].”80 Indeed, around the time of the 
debates preceding the HFE Act 2008, many scientists were quick to highlight 
the fact that their work would not involve bringing an admixed embryo to 
term.81 Popular responses to issues such as admixed embryos are often not 
drawn from law or from science, but rather from popular culture82 and science 
fiction. Again, I would like to highlight the political dimensions of popular 
culture, and consequently science fiction, given that, for many people, access 
to the legal and political system is mediated wholly through the popular cul­
ture lens.83
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In this paper, I highlighted the extent to which science fiction and law are 
already intertwined, science fiction having been commented on in a number 
of judicial decisions and law having been a theme in a great number of sci­
ence fiction texts. Moreover, I argued that science fiction allows for a space 
where alternate social and legal conditions can be considered. I noted that it 
is beneficial for law to consider these alternate conditions, given that they are 
often inspired by popular attitudes. Because science fiction both highlights 
and propagates prevalent cultural attitudes, law would do well to pay atten­
tion to the genre.
In the second part of the paper, the relationships among public discourse, 
science fiction, and law are neatly played out in relation to the issue of the 
admixed embryo. By examining the role this entity plays within both law and 
popular culture, we can begin to develop a better understanding of the cul­
tural anxieties that it creates. Texts such as Species both highlight and propa­
gate the cultural concerns that the HFE Authority described in its response 
to its public consultation, specifically concerns that scientists may go too far, 
and that perhaps nature ought not to be tampered with in this manner.84 These 
anxieties, expressed within the world of Species, in turn fed into the HFE Act 
2008, resulting in a shift in focus away from a prohibition on the admixed em­
bryo itself and toward a prohibition on its gestation and natality—events that, 
outside the film, had yet to occur. In this way, science fiction became law, and 
law science fiction. As Disch notes, “it is increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between [science fiction] and assorted neighbouring realities,” one of the most 
important of these “neighbouring realities” being law.85
I would like to thank Michael Thomson and Marie Fox for their patience and comments on earlier * 
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bryos with the $3,37,03 that Species grossed at the box office; http://www.boxofficemojo.com/
movies/?id=species.htm. Looking at these figures, perhaps we can begin to see the dynamics between 
science fiction and law.
Sherwin, 82.	 supra note 38, at 8; Posner, supra note 38, at 29.
Sherwin, 83.	 supra note 38; Posner, supra note 38.
Again, these texts include, but are not limited to, 8.	 Splice, dir. Vincenzo Natali (Copperheart, 
2009); Alastair Reynold, Redemption Ark (New York: Ace Books, 2002); Margaret Atwood, Oryx 
and Crake (New York: Nan A. Talese, 2003); Margaret Atwood, The Year of the Flood (New York: 
Nan A. Talese, 2009); The Island of Dr. Moreau, dir. John Frakenheimer (New Line Cinema, 
99).
Disch, 85.	 supra note 3, at .
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